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PREJUDGMENT WAGE GARNISHMENT: NOTICE AND
HEARING REQUIREMENTS UNDER
SNIADACH v. FAMILY FINANCE CORP.
I. GARNISHMENT STATUTES
Wage garnishment is the process by which a creditor obtains a
judicial writ ordering a debtor's employer to withhold payment to the
debtor of wages earned.' The writ is obtained by the creditor, either
as a means of securing payment of a judgment entered against the
wage earner, or as security for a claim pending adjudication. 3 In the
former case the amount of the judgment is withheld from the debtor's
paycheck and paid over to the creditor. The judgment is thereby
enforced, and the creditor obtains his settlement indirectly through
the debtor's employer. 3
 In the latter case, referred to as prejudgment
garnishment, the plaintiff-creditor obtains the writ of garnishment
when he files a claim against the alleged debtor. The amount of the
claim is withheld from the defendant's paycheck and remains frozen
until the dispute is settled. 4
 The process provides the plaintiff with
security for the anticipated judgment; if the defendant defaults or if
the plaintiff wins a judgment, the amount withheld will be paid directly
to the creditor. In both cases the process of garnishment is designed to
serve the needs of the creditor. The collection of the debt is both
insured and enforced by the court.
The process of ordering the employer to withhold wages is
identical whether it is initiated for security prior to judgment or for
execution of a judgment already obtained. 3 Prejudgment garnishment,
however, raises special questions. Focusing on the statutes of the juris-
dictions that retain the prejudgment remedy will point up these prob-
lems, as well as illustrate the basic process common to all garnishments.
A. Prejudgment Provisions
The states which provide for garnishment prior to judgment permit
the plaintiff to set the garnishment process in motion at the time the
complaint for the suit on the debt is issued.' The initial claim, the basis
1
 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment and Garnishment §§ 1-4 (1963).
2 Id. § 12.
3 Id. § 4.
4 Id. § 12.
6
 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 537 (West Supp. 1969), amending Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 537; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 541 (West 1954).
8
 Alaska Stat. §§ 09.40.010, -.030, -.35.080 (1962) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1571
(1956) ; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 31-501 (1962) ; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 537, 543 (West Supp.
1969), amending Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 537, 543 (West 1954) ; D.C. Code Encyd. Ann.
§ 16-501 (1967) ; Idaho Code §§ 8-501, -505, -508 (1947) ; Iowa Code Ann. §§ 639.1, -.3,
-.25 (1946) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 93-4301, -4306, -4314 (1963) ; N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 36-11-1, -14-I (Supp. 1969) ; N.D. Cent. Code §§ 32-09-01, -06 (1960) ; Ore.
Rev. Stat. §§ 29.110, -.140, -.270 (1967) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 10-5-1, -2, -7, -8 (1956) ;
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit, 12, §§ 3011, 3013 (1958) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-226, -235 (1957).
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for a writ of garnishment, must be an action founded on a contract,
either expressed or implied, and ordinarily one that is unsecured by
any other property? In a few states plaintiffs must also allege that
the defendant has disposed of or is about to dispose of his property,
"with the fraudulent intent to cheat, hinder or delay his creditors." 8
A special affidavit from the plaintiff is necessary to obtain a writ of
garnishment in nearly all states. Although the language varies
from state to state, the affidavit requirements are quite similar.
Plaintiffs in Washington must affirm that the debt is "just, due and
unpaid, and that the garnishment applied for is not sued out to injure
either the defendant or the garnishee."8 Garnishment affidavits in
Oregon must assert that there is a "bona fide, existing debt due and
owing from the defendant to the plaintiff . . . A clause common to
affidavits in many states requires that the writ not be sought "to
hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the defendant." Generally,
prejudgment garnishment statutes also require that the plaintiff post
a bond or undertaking prior to obtaining the writ, agreeing to pay to
the defendant all costs and damages in the event that the garnishment
is wrongfully obtained or the defendant wins the judgment." Once a
writ of garnishment is obtained by the plaintiff, it is then served
directly on the garnishee-employer. This places the employer under
order from the court to withhold from the defendant's wages a
specified amount which remains under the court's control until a
judgment is entered on the case."
Under the prejudgment garnishment statutes, the defendant's
wages are withheld as security on the claim until the suit has been
fully adjudicated." If the defendant has a valid defense he may assert
it at a trial on the merits, obtain judgment in his favor, and have his
wages remitted at the conclusion of the trial. However, once the plain-
tiff files the claim and submits the required affidavit and undertaking,
causing the garnishment writ to issue, the defendant has lost the use
of his wages until the conclusion of the case.
There are methods by which the defendant may have a prejudg-
ment writ dismissed prior to a trial of the claim. Dismissal of such a
writ must result from an attack upon the garnishment itself, and not
the underlying claim.° Examples of grounds for dismissal are: the
cause of action is not one for which a garnishment may issue, for ex-
7 Compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 537 (West Supp. 1969), amending Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 537 (West 1954), with Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 3011 (1958).
8 See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-101(7), (8) (1962) ; D.C. Code Encycl. Ann.
§ 16-501(d) (4) (1966). See also note 96 infra.
0 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. app. 7.1 § (1) (b) (Supp. 1960).
10 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 29.120(2) (1968).
11 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 538(3) (West 1954) ; Ariz, Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-1571(A) (2) (1956).
12 See, e.g., Idaho Code § 8-503 (1947) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 639.11 (1946).
13 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment and Garnishment §§ 3, 511 (1963).
14 Id. § 12.
15 Id. 431.
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ample, a tort claim; irregularities in the proceedings to procure the
writ; and insufficiency of the plaintiff's bond or undertaking. 1° The
garnishment may not, however, be attacked on the basis of the lack of
merit of the plaintiff's claim. 17 Legal or factual issues regarding the
basic debt claim cannot be raised until the trial on the merits, and
unless the garnishment writ itself is shown to be invalid the defendant's
wages are withheld until the conclusion of the trial 18
B. Provisions to Protect the Debtor
All of the states which statutorily provide for wage garnishment,
whether prior to judgment or in execution thereof, incorporate into
their statutes certain protections for the debtor. q These protections
take two forms: (1) prohibitions against discharge for reasons of
garnishment," and (2) exemption provisions whereby a certain portion
of the debtor's wages are held exempt from garnishment." Some type
of exemption provision is in effect in every state, although anti-dis-
charge provisions are not particularly common? 2
The federal government has recently entered the field of garnish-
ment legislation and as a result has preempted provisions in many
state statutes providing debtor protection in garnishment actions. Title
III of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (FCCPA), which
becomes effective on July 1, 1970, contains major provisions dealing
with prohibitions on firing and with wage exemption." The federal ap-
proach to firings because of garnishment is clear and direct: "No
employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his
earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebted-
ness."24
 For wilful violations of this section there is a maximum fine
of $1000 or imprisonment for up to one year or both." Under this
section an employee may not be fired no matter how repeatedly his
wages are garnisheed, provided the garnishment stems from the same
claim or debt. If, however, the debtor's wages are subjected to garnish-
ment by more than one plaintiff or creditor on separate claims, or
16 Id. §§ 431-32.
17
 Id. § 431.
18 Id.
10 U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards, Dep't of Labor, Wage Garnishment Restrictions
Under Federal and State Laws (1968) [hereinafter cited as Bureau of Labor Standards].
20
 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-361(a) (Supp. 1969) (employer may not
suspend, discipline or discharge an employee because of wage garnishment unless the
garnishments exceed 7 in a calendar year) ; Hawaii Rev. Laws § 378-32 (1968) (no em-
ployee may be suspended or discharged solely because his wages have been garnisheed).
21 See Bureau of Labor Standards, supra note 19.
22 Id.
28
 Consumer Credit Protection Act §§ 301-07, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (Supp. IV, 1969).
This act is frequently referrer] to as the Federal Truth in Lending Law.
24 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
23 15 U.S.C. § 1674(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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because of a second claim by the same creditor, there is no protection
against his discharge under federal law."
The exemption provision of the FCCPA sets the following limits
as the maximum part of an individual's salary that may be garnished:
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week or
(2) The amount by which his disposable earnings for that week
exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage pre-
scribed by section 6(a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 in effect at the time the earnings are payable
whichever is less."
As a practical protection for the debtor, this section is an improvement
over many of the state provisions presently in force. A number of the
state statutes exempt only a small, fixed sum each pay period as a
subsistence allowance.' Unlike these subsistence allowances, which
are continually rendered inadequate by inflation, the federal exemption
is not inflexibly bound to a dollar amount. 29 The federal exemption
is subject to criticism, however, in that the base protected amount for
one week is 30 and not 40 times the minimum hourly wage. A wage
earner working a full 40-hour week at the minimum hourly rate will
be making, by congressionally recognized standards, the minimum
necessary to support a family at a subsistence level. Yet the federal
statute allows a; wage earner to be forced below this level by as much
as 25 percent. The law is therefore inadequate as a protection for
26 In contrast to the federal limitation, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(U.C.C.C.) includes the following provision prohibiting firing because of garnishment:
No employer shall discharge an employee for the reason that a creditor of
the employee has subjected or attempted to subject unpaid earnings of the
employee to garnishment or like proceedings directed to the employer for the
purpose of paying a judgment arising from a consumer credit sale, consumer
lease, or consumer loan.
U.C.C.C. § 5.106.
27 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). Section 1672(b) defines "disposable earn-
ings" as "that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from
those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld."
28 See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 32-09-02 (Supp. 1969), amending N.D. Cent. Code
§ 32-09-02 (1960) (exempts $50 per week for a resident family head plus $5 per week
for each dependent up to 5 dependents) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 46-208 (1933) (exempts $3 per
day plus 50% of the balance). See also Bureau of Labor Standards, supra note 19, at 1-7.
20 Another major section of the federal garnishment law sets out the relationship
between the federal provisions and existing state laws. Section 1675 allows the Secretary
of Labor to refrain from applying the federal exemption provision to garnishments issued
under state laws which "provide restrictions on garnishment which are substantially similar
to those provided in § 1673(a)." 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (Supp. IV, 1969). As to more extensive
state restrictions, § 1677 declares that this title does not alter or affect in any way the
enforcement of the laws of any state:
(1) prohibiting garnishments or providing. for more limited garnishments than
are allowed under this subchapter, or
(2) prohibiting the discharge of any. employee by reason of the fact .that his
earnings have been subjected to garnishment for more than one indebtedness. •
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those workers who are not earning substantially more than the
minimum wage."
II. How GARNISHMENT AFFECTS THE DEBTOR
The effects of wage garnishment on the debtor are both sudden
and severe. Garnishment statutes generally do not provide for notice
to the debtor prior to the issuance of the writ, 8 ' and in many cases
the employee's first awareness of an attachment on his wages comes
with the less-than-full pay envelope.32 Despite the federal exemption
provision, which is a major improvement over many state subsistence
allowances,33
 the loss of up to 25 percent of a worker's normal weekly
pay is bound to cause some hardship. The class of workers whose
wages are most often subjected to garnishment seldom have any
capital to depend upon in emergencies." The family head will have a
difficult time affording necessities, and periodic payments arising from
other obligations will become impossible to meet." It is also reasonable
to assume that a person whose wages are being garnisheed will be
unable to obtain credit from other sources.
In addition to serious financial problems, the debtor is likely to
find himself in trouble with his employer. Automatically firing an em-
ployee because of a garnishment is still a regular practice among some
employers.36 The FCCPA provision now prohibits such action in cases
of "garnishment for any one indebtedness.' However, as has been
noted, the law does not protect the debtor from dismissal in the case of
garnishment by more than one creditor, or by the same creditor on a
second claim. Thus, the problem of discharge because of garnishment
is not by any means eliminated by the FCCPA, since it extends only
to a limited class of debtors.
Regardless of the extent of protection against dismissal provided
by law, the employer-employee relationship inevitably deteriorates
because of garnishment. Because additional bookkeeping is required to
comply with a writ, garnishment creates an extra burden on the
30
 This inadequacy of the federal exemption is not present in the U.C.C.C. in which
the base exemption for garnishments arising out of consumer transactions is 40 times
the minimum hourly wage. § 5.105. Utah has adopted this section of the
U.C.C.C. without modification. Utah Code Ann. § 70B-5-105(a) (b) (1969).
81
 But see N.D. Cent. Code § 32-09-03 (1960) (providing 2-days written notice
to the debtor-defendant before the garnishment writ issues).
82 Wage Garnishment in Washington—An Empirical Study, 43 Wash. •L. Rev. 743,
761 (1968). In prejudgment garnishment actions a common practice among creditors is
to initially serve the defendant's employer with the garnishment writ. The creditor can
then conveniently serve the defendant with a summons to answer the debt claim when
the defendant comes to him seeking a release from garnishment. Id. at 760 n.98.
33 See note 28 supra.
34 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at 765 & n.125.
85
 Id.; Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 759,
761-62.
36 Wage Garniihment in Washington, supra note 32, at 756-57.
37 15 U.S.C. 1674(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). •
	 •
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employer." Employer-garnishees are required to account to the court
for the garnisheed amount and are subject to contempt penalties for
failure to do so." The employer also may be responsible for applying
the local exemption provision and calculating the protected amount."
If the debt is large in comparison to the amount of earnings available
for garnishment, the withholding process may be repeated week after
week compounding the burdens on the employer.' The entire process
is an expensive nuisance for the employer who has no interest in the
debt collection:"
Another aspect of garnishment causing deterioration of the em-
ployer-employee relationship is the employer's tendency to consider
garnishment as evidence of unreliable character." The employer may
conclude that since the employee has let his debts get out of control
and has involved himself and the employer in court actions, the ap-
parent financial irresponsibility of the employee may be indicative of
general irresponsibility. It is argued by employers that these considera-
tions are important in practical .management policy,' but ideally they
should be irrelevant as long as they do not affect the worker in his
performance on the job. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the
debtor never intends that his employer become involved in his personal
financial problems, serious damage to the work relationship is the in-
evitable result."
In addition to the withholding of wages by garnishment and the
consequent job difficulties, the defendant in a prejudgment action must
defend himself in a law suit. As the alleged debtor normally will not
be familiar with the defenses available to him," a lawyer's services are
essential if he is to effectively contest the suit." But considering legal
38 Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53
Calif. L. Rev. 2214, 1229 (1965) ; Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at
755-56.
39 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1586(B) (1956).
40 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 267.18(2) (a) (Supp. 1969).
41 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 425.190(6) (1969).
42 In 1845, the Pennsylvania State Legislature abolished wage garnishment. Their
reasons, as stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, were in part:
inconvenience . . . of manufacturers and other large employers being harassed
with attachment executions . . . complicating accounts, accumulating costs, and
depriving them of labourers on whom they depended, by diverting wages from
the current support of the labourer's family to the paying of former debts.
Firmstone v. Mack, 49 Pa. 387, 392-93 (1865). See Comment, Garnishment of Wages in
Pennsylvania: Its History and Rationale, 70 Dick. L. Rev. 199 (1966).
43 Brunn, supra note 38, at 1233.
44 Id .
45 Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transactions,
8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 535, 563 n.103 (1967). If discharge because of garnishment
is prohibited, it might be anticipated that an employer who considers garnishment such a
substantial problem as to justify discharge will resort to other methods of penalizing the
debtor employee. Comment, supra note 42, at 212.
46 See generally Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at 764.
47 Even in cases of garnishment in execution of judgment, the debtor may be in need
of legal assistance just to claim the statutory exemptions to which he is entitled. Id. at 761.
467
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL. AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
fees in the light of abbreviated paychecks, only the most determined
defendant will engage counsel."
The overall effect of prejudgment garnishment is to coerce the
defendant into a settlement." Often the only practical course available
to defendants in prejudgment cases is to approach the plaintiff-creditor
and attempt to work out some agreement whereby the wages will be
released as quickly as possible." The pressures on the defendant to
meet family and financial obligations, the possibility of job loss, and
the impracticality of retaining counsel all combine to push him into
an abandonment of possible defenses.' In effect, the defendant is
forced to make a repayment arrangement, accepting whatever terms
the creditor may demand. 52
One very significant problem related to garnishments in execution
of judgments as well as the prejudgment process is that of consumer
bankruptcy. This problem is serious both because of the human dis-
tress involved and because of the vast creditor losses which con-
sumer bankruptcies represent." After extensive hearings, the House
Committee on Banking and Currency reported that there is a "clearly
established" causal connection between harsh garnishment laws and
the alarmingly high levels of personal bankruptcy 8 5 This finding sup-
ports the conclusion of several recent commentators that garnishment
is the major cause of bankruptcy among consumers."
III. PREJUDGMENT GARNISHMENT UNDER Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.
A. The SNIADACH Case
The use of garnishment to withhold the wages of an alleged
debtor before a judgment is entered against him caused the United
States Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of prejudgment
statutes in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp." The plaintiff-creditor
brought garnishment proceedings against the defendant and her em-
ployer in a Wisconsin county court. The writ was founded on the
plaintiff's claim of $450 due on a promissory note. As security for
the alleged debt, one-half of the defendant's accrued wages were
withheld by her employer subject to the order of the court. The remain-
48 See Brunn, supra note 38, at 1230.
49
 Patterson, Wage Garnishment—An Extraordinary Remedy Run Amuck, 43 Wash.
L. Rev. 735, 737 (1968).
50
 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at 753, 763-64.
51
 Patterson, supra note 49, at 738. See also Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra
note 32, at 764-65; Note, supra note 35, at 770.
52 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at 753, 763-64.
as Brunn, supra note 38, at 1235.
54 H.R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1967).
55 Id. at 20-21.
58
 Brunn, supra note 38, at 1234-38; Lee, An Analysis of Kentucky's New Exemption
Law, 55 Ky. L.J. 618, 630-31 (1967) ; Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32,
at 766-67.
57 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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ing half was paid to the defendant as the required subsistence allow-
ance under the Wisconsin garnishment law. The defendant moved to
have the garnishment writ dismissed as a deprivation of property
without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
The issuance of the writ by the court provided the necessary state
action making the fourteenth amendment applicable." The lower
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and this denial was
affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court."
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Sniadach
case presented two basic issues: (1) was this wage garnishment prior to
judgment a deprivation of property, and (2) if so, did the procedure
fail to provide the defendant with notice and hearing as required by
due process of law? Answering these questions in the affirmative, the
Supreme Court held that the application of Wisconsin's garnishment
statute" in this case was a taking of defendant's property and that it
violated the due process clause because it did not afford the defendant
either proper notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the taking."
The Court's opinion, delivered by Justice Douglas, directed itself
primarily to the issue of whether the prejudgment attachment of wages
constitutes an actual taking of property thereby making procedural
due process necessary." "Wages," the Court emphasized, "are a special-
ized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic
system."" The loss resulting from prejudgment garnishment often
imposes "tremendous hardships" on the alleged debtor." The Court
pointed to the "enormous" leverage which a creditor can exert on a
defendant by having his wages frozen, in many cases forcing the pay-
ment of fraudulent claims and inflated collection fees." In view of the
special problems created by wage garnishment, the Court stated:
"Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended
argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing . . . this
prejudgment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due
process.""
B. Wage Garnishment Distinguished
From Other Forms of Attachment
The essence of the Sniadach decision is that garnishment of
a defendant's wages is quite different from other forms of attachment
prior to judgment. Before Sniadach the garnishment of wages owed
68 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
69 Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 178, 154 N.W.2d 259, 267
(1967).
00 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 267.01 (Supp. 1968).
el 395 U.S. at 342.
62 Id. at 340.
62 Id.
69 Id.
65 Id. at 341.
66 Id. at 342.
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to a defendant was treated by the courts in the same manner as the
attachment of any type of property belonging to a defendant; pro-
cedural due process requirements did not have to be strictly complied
with before the attachment 4 7 As the Supreme Court pointed out how-
ever, "[a] procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attach-
ments in general . . . does not necessarily satisfy procedural due
process in every case."°8
 Instead, the nature of earned wages as a
modern and unique property form establishes a sound basis for dis-
tinguishing wage garnishment and providing the defendant with notice
and hearing before the wages can be withheld.
The historical basis for distinguishing wage garnishment from
other property attachments was presented in Judge Heffernan's dissent
to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's disposition of Sniadach. The Hef-
fernan opinion pointed out that although attachment itself is a fairly
old remedy, its application to the wages of a defendant is a relatively
new practice.'" Only since the beginning of the twentieth century has
the accrual bookkeeping system been widely used, with laborers being
paid on a weekly or monthly basis." Prior to the adoption of this
method of payment, there was an almost universal policy of making all
wages totally exempt from attachment." Recognizing that accrued
wages are a new form of property, it seems reasonable to conclude with
Judge Heffernan that they "should be treated by the law with that
distinction in mind."72
The most persuasive reason for treating wage garnishments
separately is the unique role wages play in our society. As the Supreme
Court stated in Sniadach, wages are "a specialized type of property
presenting distinct problems in our economic system."73 To the low
or moderate income family, no other type of property holds the same
significance as weekly earnings. There is almost total dependence on
each week's wages," and to be cut off from them would undoubtedly
mean that the quality of life will be adversely affected. If a defendant
were merely "inconvenienced" by the loss of wages as indicated by the
majority in the Wisconsin court," then the necessity for treating
garnishment separately might not be so acute. However, the United
States Supreme Court recognized this approach as unrealistic, and
stressed that many defendants rely heavily upon weekly wages, par-
67
 Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 169-73, 154 N.W.2d 259, 262-65
(1967) ; McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929), aff'g per curiam McInnes v. McKay,
127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928).
es 395 U.S. at 340.
60
 37 Wis. 2d at 181, 154 N.W.2d at 269 (dissenting opinion).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73
 395 U.S. at 340.
74
 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at 758 & n.86.
75
 37 Wis. 2d at 173, 154 N.W.2d at 264. See also Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192,
198, 163 S.E. 845, 848 (1932).
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titularly those in difficult economic circumstances." It was this aware-
ness of the vital nature of wages that led to the Court's ruling in
Sniadach that the temporary withholding of wages cannot be given the
same treatment as the attachment of other forms of property.
C. Notice and Hearing Requirements
The Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute was struck
down in Sniadach because it resulted in a deprivation of property with-
out affording to the defendant the procedural due process require-
ments of notice and prior hearing. The statute required notice to the
defendant within ten days of the issuance of the writ, making no
provision for notice before the garnishment. 77 The only hearing op-
portunity provided was that the writ, once issued, could conceivably
be dismissed if the defendant showed that the underlying claim was
either demurrable or fraudulent on its face. 78 These provisions were
ruled insufficient to satisfy minimum due process standards for notice
and hearing.
The Sniadach Court did not specify what would constitute a
sufficient hearing prior to a writ of garnishment. The opinion briefly
mentioned that the "opportunity to be heard" before one can be
deprived of his property is a constitutionally protected right, and re-
ferred to three of its previous decisions for further explanation of
this principle." The Court's opinion in one of these decisions, Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,' provides insight into the substance
of the due process hearing requirements: " [A] t a minimum . . . [the
due process clause] require [s] that deprivation of life, liberty or
property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 81 The Court stated
that a hearing is the "opportunity to present . . . objections" 82 or "the
opportunity . . . to contest." 83
Though this due process hearing principle was only alluded to in
Sniadach, the opinion did define the essence of the notice requirement.
70 395 U.S. at 340-42.
77 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 267.07(1) (Supp. 1969), amending Wis. Stat. Ann. § 267.07
(1957).
78 Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 183, 154 N.W.2d 259, 270 (dis-
senting opinion)
70 395 U.S. at 339, 342. The cases cited by the Court were Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) ; Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) ;
and Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915). The Mullane case dealt with
the judicial distribution of trust fund assets under the New York Banking Law, and held
publication notice to known beneficiaries insufficient under the due process clause.
Schroeder was an application of Mullane, striking down publication notice to an absentee
landowner in a taking of property by eminent domain. Coe ruled invalid a Florida statute
providing for execution without notice against a stockholder's property by a creditor of
the corporation. •
80 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
81 Id. at 313.
82 Id. at 314.
88 Id. at 313.
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Quoting Mullane, the Sniadach Court stated that "the right to be
heard 'has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter
is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default,
acquiesce or contest'.""
While the general principles of notice and hearing under due
process were set forth in Sniadach and Mullane, they contained no
specific formulation of the minimum notice and hearing requirements
for wage garnishment cases. The minimum standard for notice to the
defendant is the least difficult to deduce. According to Mullane, the
notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action . . . ."" Gar-
nishment cases do not present any inherent problems of identifying,
locating and serving defendants. Normally nothing in garnishment
situations prevents the plaintiff's attorney or a court officer from
serving the defendant personally with notice that a garnishment action
based on a specified debt claim is pending against his employer and
his wages. This should be the minimum notice required in garnishment
cases.
What might constitute minimum hearing standards for garnish-
ment statutes under Sniadach is more difficult to determine. Several
alternatives may be suggested whereby the defendant is afforded an
opportunity to be heard on the merits of the underlying claim prior to
the issuance of the garnishment writ. One solution is to require a full
trial of the creditor-debtor dispute before any garnishment action can
be instituted, thereby eliminating the prejudgment procedure. The
plaintiff-creditor would then be prevented from attaching any wages
until his debt claim has been fully adjudicated and he has obtained a
judgment by prevailing on the merits of his case.
Another approach to the problem of providing an adequate
hearing was suggested in Judge Heffernan's dissent to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision in Sniadach. He suggested that the best way to
insure the defendant's rights would be to provide for a mandatory
trial on the merits within a limited and statutorily defined time follow-
ing the seizure of the defendant's wages." Such a procedure would
afford the plaintiff whatever security advantages prejudgment garnish-
ment presently offers, and would also give the defendant full hearing
on the claim within only a short period after the garnishment. Though
this compromise procedure would reduce the length of the deprivation
and probably the consequent hardships on the defendant, it would,
nevertheless, contravene the pridr hearing principle set forth by the
Supreme Court in Mullane and Sniadach which requires that the de-
fendant must be provided with an opportunity to be heard before
he may be deprived of the use of his wages. 87
84 395 U.S. at 339-40.
88
 339 U.S. at 314.
se 37 Wis. 2d at 183, 154 M.W.2d at 270 (dissenting opinion).
87 395 U.S. at 342.
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Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Sniadach intimated that a
hearing might take a form other than a full trial and still satisfy due
process in garnishment cases. In describing the practice of prejudg-
ment garnishment under the Wisconsin statute, the opinion stated that
the defendant was deprived of the enjoyment of his wages, "without
any opportunity to be heard and to tender any defense he may have,
whether it be fraud or otherwise."88 This indicates that a satisfactory
prior hearing might simply provide the defendant the opportunity to
appear within a limited time and assert some general defense to the
plaintiff's debt claim. A judge under this procedure would simply
determine whether or not any of the defenses asserted would result in
a judgment for the defendant if proven at a trial on the merits. If one
of the defenses asserted was legally sufficient, then a full trial on the
merits would ensue before the defendant could be deprived of his
wages. If the defendant failed to appear, or if the defense he asserted
obviously had no legal merit, then the garnishment writ could issue
prior to a final judgment upholding the plaintiff's claim.
A similar type of hearing was suggested by the concurring opinion
of Justice Harlan, which stated that due process is afforded "only by
the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the
validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim
against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property
or its unrestricted use."89 Such a "probable validity" hearing would
require the judge to sit as a fact-finder. On the basis of the pleadings,
affidavits, and oral testimony of the parties the judge would weigh
the merits of the claim against the defenses raised. If the judge de-
termined at such a hearing that the plaintiff's claim would probably
be upheld at a jury trial, he could then issue a garnishment writ prior
to trial of the case. If, on the other hand, the defenses raised were
legally sufficient and probably supportable by fact, no garnishment
could take place until after a full trial.
Both the probable validity hearing and the procedure whereby
a defendant could simply assert a legally sufficient defense to avoid
prejudgment garnishment appear to meet the due process prior hearing
requirement of the Sniadach Court. It is quite clear, however, that
either of these hearing procedures would be meaningless without man-
datory notice to the defendant of the pendency of the action and his
upcoming opportunity to be heard, allowing him a reasonable time to
prepare for the hearing."
D. The Effect of Sniadach on Prejudgment Garnishment Statutes
The existing prejudgment garnishment provisions" are, for the
most part, embodied in the states' general property attachment
88 Id. at 339.
89 Id. at 343 (concurring opinion).
go Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).
91 See note 6 supra.
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statutes," and are based on the assumption that the withholding of
wages for security on a contract claim merely creates a temporary lien
on the defendant's property without an actual deprivation." More-
over, the statutes give no indication that the attachment of wages
should be treated differently than the attachment of any other form of
property. Thus, they fail to provide notice or prior hearing as required
by Sniadach and are of questionable validity under present due process
standards.
Application of the requirements in Sniadach, however, is not
absolute, for while the Court ruled prejudgment garnishment without
notice and prior hearing unconstitutional, it acknowledged that "[sjuch
summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due process
in extraordinary situations . . . requiring special considerations to a
state or creditor interest . . . ."" None of the four cases cited by the
Court to illustrate extraordinary situations, however, involved wage
garnishment, and only one of them, Ownbey v. Morgan, involved a
property attachment as a preliminary step in a debt claim." The Court
indicated that wage garnishment is not generally used in these extraor-
dinary situations, but if it were so used, a vital state or creditor
interest might justify less than strict adherence to procedural due
process.
An extraordinary situation may exist where there is no possibility
of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over the debtor. This was not a
problem in Sniadach where, as the Court noted, the defendant was a
resident of the community in which her wages were garnisheed, and in
personam jurisdiction was readily obtainable." In Ownbey, on the
other hand, the quasi in rem attachment of shares of stock in Delaware
was upheld as the only means of obtaining jurisdiction over a Colorado
defendant who was absent from the jurisdiction." This would seem
92 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 537, 543 (Supp. 1969), amending Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code §§ 537, 543 (West 1954) ; Idaho Code Ann. §§ 8-501, -505, -508 (1947) ; Iowa Code
Ann. §§ 639.1, -.3, -.25 (1946).
93 See Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 169-73, 154 N.W.2d 259,
262-65; McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820, aff'g per curiam McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me.
110, 141 A. 699 (1928).
94 395 U.S. at 339.
95 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), upheld as reasonable a Delaware practice
requiring a foreign defendant who had left the state, leaving behind no property, to post
security for his attached stock certificates pending adjudication of the claim against him.
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), upheld the taking of possession of a marginal
bank by a Federal Home Loan Administration conservator without notice or prior hearing
because of the delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility of preserving credit
during an investigation. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950),
upheld a Federal Food and Drug Administration seizure of misbranded articles on a
finding of probable cause prior to prosecution by the Attorney General. Coffin Bros. v.
Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), upheld a state Superintendent of Banks' assessment against
the property of the stockholders of a closed bank on the grounds that at a stockholder's
request a trial could be held to defeat the assessment and that the stockholders had
voluntarily assumed this liability.
96 395 U.S. at 339.
97 256 U.S. at 107-08, 111.
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to be the exception, however, for in the great majority of cases a
wage earner, though he may not actually reside within the jurisdiction,
would presumably be present there during working hours, and obtain-
ing personal service on him would be no more difficult than attaching
his wages through a garnishment writ served on the employer. Thus,
the employee's nonresidency in the jurisdiction in which he works
should not be a sufficient ground for prejudgment garnishment. Only
when the nonresidency is accompanied by the practical impossibility
of obtaining in personam jurisdiction does such an extraordinary
situation exist as to justify the use of prejudgment garnishment with-
out notice or hearing."
It was further stated by the Sniadach Court that prejudgment
garnishment in these extraordinary situations is allowable only where
the prejudgment statute is so "narrowly drawn" as to be capable of
being applied only under such unusual conditions." The Wisconsin
statute clearly fails in this respect as it provides: "Any creditor may pro-
ceed [with a garnishment action] against any person who is indebted to
or has any property in his possession or under his control belonging to
such creditor's debtor . . . .'7100
 Other statutes cite extraordinary situa-
tions such as the unavailability of in personam jurisdiction or an ab-
sconding defendant as grounds for prejudgment garnishment, but also
allow it in any situation where the creditor is suing on an unsecured
contract claim."' Such statutes are not in fact distinguishable from the
Wisconsin statute and should also be ruled unconstitutional, because
they do not provide the defendant with notice and hearing prior to
attachment, and they do not narrowly restrict the use of the prejudg-
ment process to truly extraordinary situations."'
98 But see City Finance Co. v. Williams, Civil No. 65-23497-67 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess.,
June 18, 1969), granting a judgment in rem against the wages of a non-resident defendant
which were garnisheed without notice or prior hearing. The facts presented by the District
of Columbia court in this case did not make it clear whether or not in personam juris-
diction was readily obtainable over the defendant, who worked in the District but lived
in neighboring Virginia.
99 395 U.S. at 339.
100 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 267.01(1) (Supp. 1968).
I01 See note 6 supra. But compare the old and new prejudgment provisions of Min-
nesota and Washington. Law of June 9, 1969, ch. 1142, § 571.41, 0969] Minn. Acts
1773-4, formerly Minn. Stat. § 571.41 (1967); Law of May 23, 1969, ch. 264, §§ 1, 3, 4,
U9691 Wash. Acts 1149-50, formerly Wash, Rev. Code Ann. §§ 732.010, -.020, -.030
(1961).
The District of Columbia statute includes as one alternative ground for prejudgment
garnishment that the defendant "has assigned, conveyed, disposed of, or secreted, or is
about to assign, convey, dispose of, or secrete his property with intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud his creditors." D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. § 16-501(d) (4) (1966). When used as
a limitation on the prejudgment attachment of wages, this provision can have little mean-
ing. A wage earner who cashes his pay check so that he may pay the rent, purchase
groceries and other necessities is "about to ... dispose of . • . his property" impliedly
with the "intent" that his creditors will have to suffer some delay. The difficulty seems
to arise from the failure throughout these statutes to make any distinction between wages
and other forms of property. See pp. 469-71 supra; but see note 92 supra.
102 The prejudgment statutes of three states, California, North Dakota and Oregon,
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IV. PROHIBITION OF PRE JUDGMENT GARNISHMENT
Theoretically, the purpose of prejudgment garnishment is to
provide plaintiff-creditors with security on debt claims. 103 However,
the process of prejudgment garnishment is primarily used by creditors
as a high pressure collection device.'" The practice serves creditors
by causing severe hardships on debtors and forcing the settlement of
what are often unjust claims.'" Because of these unnecessary hard-
ships on the debtor resulting from the use of the prejudgment process,
prejudgment garnishment should be abolished in less than extraor-
dinary circumstances, even if the state statutes can be revised to meet
the Sniadach notice and hearing requirements.
The loss of whatever security prejudgment garnishment presently
provides creditors would be of minimum significance. As a rule, the
garnishment process is able to secure only a portion of the alleged
debt due before the claim can be adjudicated.'" Moreover, the plain-
tiff, should he prevail at the trial, will usually have ample opportunity
to satisfy the judgment. A wage earner is unlikely to abandon his job,
very likely his only asset, and flee the jurisdiction because of a debt
claim, and there is little evidence that defendants do attempt to
escape judgments in this way. 107
Garnishment before judgment is favored by creditors because it
serves as a highly effective collection device,148 forcing the defendant
into a repayment agreement without the necessity of securing a final
judgment 1 00 Though these out-of-court settlements may be defended
by creditors as avoiding unnecessary litigation, the coercive effect of
garnishment on debtors renders the circumstances under which the
settlements are reached unfair.' 1° Claims which defendants agree to
have been declared unconstitutional in Attorney Generals' Opinions. CCH New Develop-
ments, Consumer Credit Guide 99.887, 99.904. Two state courts have ruled their pre-
judgment statutes unconstitutional under Sniadach. Arnold v. Knettle, 1 CA-CIV 768,
Ariz. (1969), struck down the Arizona statute which was quite similar to the Wisconsin
provision, and State Credit Ass'n v. Lewis, No. 710166 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1969), upheld
a judge who had been quashing all prejudgment writs before him on the strength of
Sniadach.
103 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment and Garnishment § 12 (1963).
104 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at 749.
108 Id. at 764-65.
1013 Brunn, supra note 38, at 1221.
107 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at 751-54.
108
	 at 749.
100
 Judge Patterson of the Everett (Wash.) District Justice Court made the follow-
ing statement based on his experience with garnishment:
In the 227 cases of 311 garnishment cases sampled involving garnishment before
judgment not one went to trial. The usual notation on the docket was "Dismissed
with Prejudice—settled." The writer recalls only one case of the 2,600 cases filed
in the Everett Court in 1967 in which a defendant went to trial after a prejudg-
ment garnishment.
Patterson, supra note 49, at 735-36.
110 In both justice court and superior court, garnishments are issued by the clerk
of the court on the basis of affidavits, written in the language of the statutes, in
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settle under pressure of garnishments are often invalid or based on
fraudulent transactions.' In addition, the creditor's collection fees
and other costs resulting from the garnishment action are added to
the claim and assessed to the defendant." Frequently these charges
are inflated, and they constitute a substantial part of the settlement
which the harassed defendant ultimately accepts.' A court determina-
tion of the merits of the claim prior to garnishment would be the most
effective means'of eliminating this practice.
The harmful effects of prejudgment garnishment on the debtor,
weighed against the minimal security provided the creditor, suggest
that the device is no longer effective and should be abolished. If
garnishment before judgment is prohibited, defendants will not be
prevented by financial pressure or inconvenience from presenting their
available defenses. This is the direction taken by the Sniadach decision
even though prejudgment garnishment was allowed when accompanied
by adequate notice and hearing." However, the coercive effects of
prejudgment garnishment would not necessarily be eliminated by
modifying the process to include a pretrial hearing before the issuance
of a writ. Unless he could retain legal counsel, an unsophisticated
defendant would be at a great disadvantage relative to creditors at
such a hearing, and failure at this stage might cause a defendant,
under the pressure of garnishment, to give up contesting the claim any
further. Such a preliminary hearing would also increase the burden
on the courts and parties and, aside from the minimal amount of
prejudgment security afforded to a creditor by this method, would be of
little value in settling the ultimate issues. Moreover, if the plaintiff has
a legitimate claim, he is entitled to have it reduced to a judgment as
quickly as possible and in a manner consistent with the defendant's due
which the only things are the names of the defendant, garnishee defendant,
affiant and notary not printed in advance. The judges, by and large, never see a
writ until long after it has been issued, . . . For most wage earners weekly wages
are the only asset of any real importance. Where there are neither savings,
benevolent friends, nor relatives to fall back on, the loss of garnished wages,
even for the three-week period between garnishment and default judgment, may
well mean eviction on a three-day notice for failure to pay rent, repossession of
the car necessary for transportation to the job, arrest for failure to make support
payments, or any number of hazards which afflict the man who is unable to
meet his obligations when due. If the defendant has a defense to a claim which
he wishes to assert at trial, he can expect to be parted from his wages for an
additional thirty to sixty days or more. Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent
the plaintiff from filing additional writs pending trial save the anticipated dis-
pleasure of a judge known not to favor such maneuvers. The coercive nature of
prejudgment garnishment upon the poor is clear.
Id. at 737.
111
 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341 (1969).
112 Id.
113 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at 75 & n.58.
114 395 U.S. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring); see p. 473 supra.
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process rights. A preliminary hearing for the purpose of obtaining a
prejudgment garnishment writ would only add to the delay and cost of
a final judgment without increasing either the efficiency or the equity of
the resolution. Thus, the interests of both parties would be served by
total repeal of the existing statutes and by elimination of prejudgment
garnishment in all but extraordinary situations, such as the impossibil-
ity of obtaining in personam jurisdiction.
Though wage garnishment before the creditor obtains a judgment
is particularly difficult to justify, garnishment-related problems are
such that the continued use of the practice in execution of judgments
should also be questioned. Especially acute is the consumer bank-
ruptcy problem,'" which according to one federal referee can be
substantially reduced only through the exemption of all wages from
garnishment."' Five states currently provide complete wage exemp-
tion,1" and the National Consumer Law Center has included such a
provision in a recently proposed comprehensive model consumer pro-
tection act, citing the per capita bankruptcy rates in these states as
the lowest in the nation." 8
 Personal bankruptcy and the other result-
ing hardships from garnishment make the legal system appear to the
poor as "an instrument of oppression rather than a force for justice,""°
and garnishment has been cited as one of the many factors causing the
alienation of ghetto residents which has led to rioting."° There are
less harsh alternative collection remedies available, 121 and, more im-
portantly, creditors may now utilize advanced methods of evaluating
credit risks,'" and in many cases eliminate the overextension of
credit which makes garnishment necessary.'" Weighing the harmful
115 H.R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1967).
116
 Lee, supra note 56, at 635.
117
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.11 (1961) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-362 (1951) ; Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 42, § 886 (1966) ; S.D. Code § 33-2404 (Supp. 1960) ; Tex. Const. art. 16, § 28
(1955) ; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 3832, 4099 (1966).
118 Office of Legal Services, Office of Economic Opportunity, National Consumer
Act: A Model Act for Consumer Protection § 5.106(1)(a) & Comment (1970). The Act
was drafted by the National Consumer Law Center at Boston College Law School. See
also Brunn, supra note 38, at 1234-38; Lee, supra note 56, at 635.
119 Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. Ind.
& Com. L. Rev. 441, 457 (1967).
120 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 276-77 (1968).
121 Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at 783; Comment, supra note
42, at 211.
It is suggested that in many cases when a creditor resorts to wage garnishment he
defeats himself and other creditors as well by causing the job loss or bankruptcy of a
debtor who might otherwise have been able to satisfy his obligations given a longer time
period. See Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note 32, at 767-68, 770.
122 Jordan & Warren, supra note 119, at 457; Wage Garnishment in Washington,
supra note 32, at 783; Comment, supra note 42, at 211.
123 See Jordan & Warren, supra note 119, at 457, which states:
The ability to use the courts as collection agencies no doubt has encouraged some
creditors to induce debtors to incur more debt than they can actually manage.
Coercion by the state to pay debts is defensible where the debtor can pay but
will not, and the Spector of the "deadbeat" is constantly invoked by creditors to
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effects of wage garnishment against its diminished necessity may lead
in the future to the complete abolition of the practice whether it is
employed prior to or in execution of a judgment.
CONCLUSION
Wage garnishment imposes serious hardships on the debtor, and
when the practice is invoked prior to judgment it tends to coerce him
into unfair settlements. The Sniadach decision has ruled that prejudg-
ment garnishment without notice and prior hearing is unconstitutional in
all but extraordinary situations. However, because of the harmful
effects involved, prejudgment garnishment should be eliminated en-
tirely, and the continued use of wage garnishment in execution of
judgment should also be seriously examined.
CHARLES J, HELY
justify tough collection remedies. All too often, however, it is not the "deadbeat,"
but rather the naive victim of the overreaching creditor, who is subjected to the
worst collection practices. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly doubtful whether
many of the traditional creditor remedies are needed by legitimate creditors .
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